He himself and I by Pearson, H
 
 
snippets 
 
Issue 31       March 2017 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Contents 
 
1. Lisa Bylinina. Count lists cross-linguistically vs bootstrapping the counting system. 
2. Isabelle Charnavel and Emmanuel Chemla. More hybrid agreement: simultaneous  
    agreement with two competing triggers. 
3. Kleanthes Grohmann, Markus Pöchtrager, Tobias Scheer, Michael Schiffmann and  
    Neven Wenger. The Apex Paradox. 
4. Nina Haslinger and Viola Schmitt. Stressed non-Boolean und (and) in German.  
5. Sara S. Loss. Two types of subordinate subject contact relatives.  
6. Andreea Nicolae, Patrick D. Elliott and Yasutada Sudo. Do superiority-violating  
    multiple singular which-questions have pair-list readings?  
7. Hazel Pearson. He himself and I. 
8. Uli Sauerland. A note on grammaticality and analyticity. 
9. Tatjana Scheffler. Root infinitives on Twitter. 
10.Yasutada Sudo. Another problem for alternative-based theories of plurality inferences:  
     the case of reduplicated plural nouns in Japanese. 
11. Yasutada Sudo. De re readings of nested which-phrases in embedded questions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Snippets - Issue 31 – March 2017 
http://www.ledonline.it/snippets/ 
 
- 20 - 
7.           
 
Hazel Pearson – Queen Mary University of London 
He himself and I 
 
h.pearson@qmul.ac.uk 
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.7358/snip-2017-031-pear 
 
 
 
John sees himself in a mirror, but fails to recognize that it’s him. He thinks, ‘that guy is 
an idiot’, but not ‘I am an idiot’. (1) has a reading on which it is true in this situation 
(the ‘de re’ reading), and a reading on which it is false (‘de se’).  
(1) John thinks that he is an idiot.  
This snippet concerns the use of he himself in sentences of this kind.  The readings of 
he himself in (2) are notoriously more limited than those of he in (1), and pose a puzzle. 
(2) John thinks that he himself is an idiot.  
 
 According to a received view, he himself is obligatorily de se.  If true, this means 
that (2) can only describe a situation in which John thinks ‘I am an idiot.’  This view 
stems from a philosophical tradition beginning with (Geach 1957; Castañeda 1968), 
and has subsequently been endorsed by linguists (Chierchia 1990; Higginbotham 
2003). Castañeda called he himself a ‘quasi-indicator’. The hallmarks of quasi-
indicators are (i) the inability to refer to an individual other than an attitude holder and 
(ii) unambiguous de se construal.  He himself seems to have the property in (i), and 
differs in that respect from he, as (3) shows. In the years following Castañeda’s 
influential paper, it was assumed that any anaphor displaying (i) is a quasi-indicator, 
and hence also displays (ii). This assumption underpins a wealth of work on the 
semantics of attitude reports including Heim 2001, 2002; Schlenker 2000; von Stechow 
2002, 2003. 
(3) a. Speaking of Billi, John thinks that hei is an idiot.  
     b. *Speaking of Billi, John thinks that [he himself]i is an idiot.   
 
But it turns out that he himself allows a de re reading as well under certain 
circumstances. Consider again the story above: John, unaware that he is looking in a 
mirror, thinks ‘that guy is an idiot’. In response to the question in (4), it would make 
sense to answer (2), with focal stress on himself.  
(4) I don’t understand the story. Who does John think is an idiot?  
So he himself has two alternative uses in sentences like (2), as a de se pronoun and as a 
focused de re pronoun. The puzzle this poses is: why precisely these two uses? Or, to 
put it another way, how does focus come to permit de re construal?  
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The test in (4) builds on an insight from Schlenker (2000: 59), who noted that the 
facts about the interpretation of he himself are unclear, and suggested that ‘himself 
might be used as a device of focalization’. A congruent answer to the question in (4) 
assigns focus to the subject of think’s complement; on this view, the reflexive can serve 
as a device for marking this. Maybe one can maintain that, without this motivation for 
use of the emphatic reflexive, what is emphasized is that the reported belief is de se.   
 
These facts show that he himself is not in fact a quasi-indicator. Until recently, the 
other prime candidates as exemplars of quasi-indicators were logophoric pronouns: the 
distribution of these elements is limited to the scope of attitude verbs, and they 
unambiguously pick out the attitude holder. But they too allow de re readings, at least 
in the Niger-Congo language Ewe (Pearson 2013, 2015). Perhaps there are no quasi-
indicators?  
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